

*MASTER
NEGATIVE
NO. 93-81167-1*

2
MICROFILMED 1993

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK

as part of the
"Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project"

Funded by the
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES

Reproductions may not be made without permission from
Columbia University Library

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code - concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material.

Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or other reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement.

This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law.

AUTHOR:

HODGSON, SHADWORTH
HOLLWAY

TITLE:

INTER-RELATION OF THE
ACADEMICAL SCIENCES

PLACE:

LONDON

DATE:

[1906]

Master Negative #

91-01167-1

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT

BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROFORM TARGET

Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record

060
H66

Hodgson, Shadworth Hollway, 1832-1912.

... Inter-relation of the academical sciences, by Shadworth H. Hodgson ... <From the Proceedings of the British academy, vol. II> London, Pub. for the British academy by H. Frowde [1906]

cover-title, 16 p. 24¹/₂ cm.

At head of title: The British academy.

062B

P

1905-06.

Another copy. (In British academy. Proceedings. 1905-06. p. [219]-234.)
r. British academy, London.

Library of Congress

7-41108

Restrictions on Use:

TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA

FILM SIZE: 35mm


REDUCTION RATIO: 11X

IMAGE PLACEMENT: IA IIA IB IIB

DATE FILMED: 3/18/93

INITIALS JAMES

FILMED BY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS, INC WOODBRIDGE, CT




AIIM


Association for Information and Image Management

1100 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1100
Silver Spring, Maryland 20910


301/587-8202




Centimeter



Inches



MANUFACTURED TO AIIM STANDARDS
BY APPLIED IMAGE, INC.



Hodgson

Interrelation of the
social sciences



060

H66

Columbia University
in the City of New York
Library



Special Fund
Given anonymously

THE BRITISH ACADEMY

Inter-Relation
Of the Academical Sciences

By
Shadworth H. Hodgson
Fellow of the Academy

[From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. II]

London

Published for the British Academy
By Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press Warehouse
Amen Corner, E.C.

Price One Shilling net

INTER-RELATION OF THE ACADEMICAL SCIENCES

By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read March 14, 1906

I.

My aim in the paper which I now have the honour of reading before this meeting of the Academy is to contribute in some measure, however slight, to the furtherance of what I take to be the main purpose for which we exist as an Academy, which is our special justification as an Academy, and not merely one among the learned Societies which for various purposes exist around us, the purpose namely of bringing the various mental and moral sciences into co-operation, and rendering their results more readily accessible to one another than they would otherwise be; these sciences being those which find their object-matter in some branch of human activity, that is, in what men consciously feel and think and are and do, just as the positive physical sciences find the object of their study in Matter and physical energies of every kind.

It is thus what may be called the internal organization of the Academical Sciences that I have in view in the present paper. Our President, in his Address delivered at our first Annual General Meeting, on June 26, 1903, has repeatedly and emphatically insisted on the corporate organization of the students of these sciences as the great purpose of the Academy; and has well shown its necessity and described its advantages. To what he has so admirably said on these points I have nothing to add. It is rather to the relation of the sciences themselves to one another, that is, their internal organization as a body of knowledge, that I propose to address myself. Here perhaps there is room for some further observations. For I think that, unless we were distinctly agreed upon the common ground which the four Sections of the Academy alike occupy, and which constitutes the nexus between them, by the knowledge of it being perceived as the ulterior End which all alike, as sciences of practice, have in view,

H

our four Sections would still be little more than a bundle of learned Societies accidentally associated, and not, strictly speaking, an organic unity. But in beginning as an Academy, which, whatever else it may be, is at any rate a Society for the intercommunication of ideas between the students of different subjects, rather than for the study of any subject or group of subjects separately, we have begun as an organic unity, and our division into Sections is the beginning of our organization as an unity; it remains to bring the nature and basis of that unity and of that organization into distinct consciousness.

Of course this does not involve the idea that a specialist in any one Section or Sub-section should become a specialist in any other, though, where any member is a member of more than one, it is doubtless a circumstance to be welcomed. The work of each Section must always be done by those who are specialists in that Section. A specialist's knowledge of its subject-matter is not to be expected of the members of the other Sections. The organization of which I speak consists, first, in the recognition, by specialists in all the Sections, of the ulterior end to which their special science is subordinate, to the attainment of which it is a contributory, and secondly in the readiness with which the best that is being thought and known in any Section can be brought within reach of workers in any other Section.

The first question, then, to be entertained and answered, in justification of our title of an Academy, is this,—in what does this common ulterior End, which is also the *nexus* and common basis of all our Sections, consist? It must be something which differentiates the purposes of all alike from the purposes of the group of simply natural and positive sciences which are directed to the discovery of the *de facto* laws of physical nature, increasing by that discovery the wealth of speculative knowledge, and the command which man has of physical agencies for the supply of his wants and for the effectuation of his purposes, whatever these may be. The discovery of the *de facto* laws of physical nature is thus the *differentia* of positive science, the End which specially characterizes it; we describe these phenomena and their laws in terms of matter, ether, motion, force, and energy, mechanical, chemical, magnetic, electrical, and so forth; and we abstract from the circumstance, that our knowledge or surmise of these energies, these phenomena, and their laws, consists of consciousness, or that consciousness is our only evidence for them, either for their nature or for their existence. That fact goes without saying, and is hardly ever adverted to. Of course I am not forgetting the constant use made of what is known as the 'personal equation'

in the observation of physical phenomena. But this is no objection or exception to the foregoing statement. In taking account of the 'personal equation' the observer himself is thought of as an instrument, an object of observation in just the same sense as the objects which he observes. The idea that his consciousness is his only evidence for his own existence does not, or at least need not, occur to him.

But when we come to phenomena in thinking of which we can no longer make abstraction from modes or forms of consciousness, seeing that these are involved in the thought of the phenomena themselves, which is the case whenever we think of a desire, or of an interest, or of a purpose of any kind, or compare different Ends or purposes together in respect of their preferability or value, real or apparent, notwithstanding that the purpose or end itself may be described simply as some change to be wrought in physical matter;—as, for instance, when a flint arrow-head, or a piece of pottery, unearthed from a grave-mound, derives its present interest for the archaeologist simply from the fact that it has, ages ago, supplied the felt needs, interests, or purposes of conscious beings, and from the light which it thereby throws upon their habits and attainments;—and since at the same time we have no immediate knowledge of the agency which is immediately concerned in supporting those modes or forms of consciousness;—then we inevitably find our point of view changed from what it was in the field of physical science; we adopt consciousness as our point of view, instead of abstracting from it; and we include in the thought and term *consciousness* the immediate agent or agency which supports it, but of which we have no immediate knowledge, calling the two taken together by the various names of I, Ego, Soul, Mind, or Self, and leaving open thereby problems of the greatest difficulty for Psychology to investigate, namely, in the first place that of the nature of the connexion between consciousness and the agent or agency immediately concerned in supporting it, and secondly that of the connexion between either consciousness or its immediately supporting agency and the other agencies at work in the living physical organism, which are the objects studied in biology and physiology.

The position of Psychology is thus unique among the sciences; it has a double character; it takes up the thread of investigation at the point where it is dropped by the positive physical sciences; it is itself both a positive, speculative, physical science, so far as it is based on biological and physiological knowledge, and it is a philosophical and Academical science, so far as it is based on

A.C.C. Dec. 1-06

6.13.16

25

the phenomena of consciousness, and uses terms of consciousness in describing and investigating them. It is that science of the second group which connects the second group with the first. The conscious organism as the seat of individual consciousness, and the agent concerned in effectuating conscious purposes, is that which we have before us in all departments of this second or Academical group of sciences, however the problems mentioned above may finally be answered by Psychology as a special member of the group. Man, in short, and his conscious activities in every direction, and the relations of men with men, and with other conscious beings, are the object-matter of this second group of sciences; and the *differentia* of the group as a whole consists in its taking *consciousness* as the point of view from which it distinguishes, compares, and passes judgement on those various activities, and on the character and ability of the actors.

The question, then, which was proposed at starting, as to the ulterior End which all our Sections have before them, can now be answered. It is the harmonizing and organizing into a system the knowledge obtained, in each Section and Sub-section, of those conscious activities which are its special province, and that again with the still further purpose (inasmuch as all knowledge has some practical use as its end) of harmonizing and organizing those conscious activities themselves into a concerted and combined Life of mankind on earth, political, social, and individual. But with this further purpose, the application of knowledge in actual practice, that is to say, with Art as distinguished from Science, we have nothing as an Academy to do, except to criticize it from the scientific platform. It is with the Sciences of conscious activities, and with their organization as a system of knowledge, that we are concerned, as the ulterior End which our several Sections have before them. We are not a literary, or an aesthetic, or a moral, or a religious, or a juristic, or in the ordinary sense of the term a sociological, or in any way a political, but solely a scientific body. But our sciences, all the same, are sciences of practice. Arts, it is true, are also scientific, but that does not make them sciences of practice. From these they are properly distinguished by the name of practical sciences.

The conscious activities of men being thus the object-matter with which as a group of sciences we have to deal, it follows that we have to deal with them as defined and described by the modes of consciousness embodied in them, the purposes at which they are said to aim. Conscious life is a hierarchy of purposes. A purpose immediately aimed at is an End. An immediate purpose attained is a Means to a further purpose. The comparative value of purposes,

whether as means or as ends, is what we have to determine, and that in every department of inquiry. The whole of consciousness is teleological in the sense that the ultimate elements into which it may be analysed are distinguishable but never separable, that is, presuppose and are adapted to one another, without which correspondence and combination of elements the consciousness which they constitute would not exist, seeing that they are not consciousness in separation, and it is only by abstraction (which has always the concrete in the background) that we can think of them as separate.

For example, sensations of light or of colour are not sensations unless they occupy some form of superficial spatial extension, apart from which they exist only as abstractions introduced by thought. The same is true of sensations of touch and pressure; you cannot even think the thought of actually touching a mathematical point, at least when this is taken in the Euclidean sense of a division, not an atom, of space. Nor, again, can you think of pure space except by abstraction; pure space, as a pure existent not due to abstraction, is pure nonentity; it is not the same thing as pure vacuity, which is plainly an abstraction, that is, you have to think of filled space in order to think it. Time-duration, again, is an element of consciousness which is universally present in all feelings or modes of consciousness whatever, and which cannot itself be felt or thought of, except by abstraction, as separably existent; as a pure existent not due to abstraction, it would, like pure space, be a pure nonentity. And feelings which should be supposed to exist for no time-duration would plainly thereby be supposed not to exist at all.

There is therefore in all consciousness, and consequently in all things whatever which we can either positively know, or surmise, or imagine, as its objects, a teleologic character, a harmony of different elements, which is inherent in them and essential to their being what they are, the basis of, or rather identical with, their rationality. We may say that teleology, in this sense, and rationality are the same; teleologic being the name we give an idea or its object when we take its constituent elements or parts severally, and consider any one of them as if it was prior to the whole, and rational being the name we give it when we take it first as a whole, before considering the several elements or parts which analysis distinguishes as composing it. There is no idea, and consequently no object of an idea, which escapes this statical mode of consideration, so to call it, which nevertheless, however necessary and essential it may be, obviously tells us nothing as to what ideas are true and what fictitious, seeing that their teleology or rationality is essential to all ideas alike, simply in

their character of modes of consciousness, the *minima* of which are analysable into teleologic elements.

In all ideas, then, from the least to the greatest, from that of a *minimum* of consciousness to that of the Universe or Totality of Existents, whatever else there may be, there is this teleologic or rational character. But ideas are not the ultimate *data* of consciousness; that is to say, consciousness does not come to us, or arise in us, in the form of ideas severally distinct from one another, any more than it arises in the form of *minima* of consciousness. Attention to consciousness, or apperception in some shape or other, goes to the making both of an idea and of a *minimum*. Consciousness arises in the form of a stream, a time-stream of consciousness, the different parts of which, whether simultaneous or successive or overlapping, are distinguished from one another by differences in the feelings, sensations, emotions, and so on, which are the content of the time-duration, including those visual and tactual sensations and their combinations which are spatially extended also, and are our evidence for the existence of a spatially extended and material world, the premisses from which its nature and existence are inferred.

From this time-stream arises our idea of the distinction of Time into past, present, and future. In attention to any portion of the stream we observe it passing away and becoming what we call a *memory*; that is the *past*,—irrevocable. While still retained in consciousness without perceivable change, it is the *present*,—modifiable. Here our immediate knowledge ends; but attention is always anticipatory, always has a purpose in view, and in the simplest cases this purpose is merely that of feeling or knowing the present more vividly or more clearly. Still it is anticipation, purpose not yet realized, not yet actual consciousness; the present moment contains a present expectation of something which is not present but to come;—that is the *future*. Time-duration is the common element, the common nexus of the whole stream. The efficient causes (so to call them) which throw up, as it were, the successive present moments of the stream of consciousness lie, though unknown to us except by subsequent inference, in the past, as the stream itself also does. They belong to, and are part of, a series and system of agents and events which have been moving onwards from past to present, and will continue to move onwards from present to future, that is to say, in the opposite direction to that in which, as noted above, the consciousness moves to which they give rise, which is the direction from the actual present to the past of memory. The present moment of consciousness recedes into the past, or becomes a memory, in order of know-

ledge, or as part of our knowing, and advances into the future, or becomes a new present, in order of existence or real genesis from its efficient causes.

To render this less paradoxical than at first sight it may seem, it must be considered that every new present moment of consciousness, as it arises, has a twofold character, a twofold aspect; first, *what* it is, namely, its content as consciousness or as a knowing, and secondly the *fact* that it is, its character *as* an existent. And it is the perception that every actually present moment contains, as part of itself, a memory of what has been actually present the moment before, that gives the whole experience the character of a stream, a time-stream of consciousness, ever receding into the past as each new present moment arises and advances into the as yet unknown future. It is the content of consciousness, in which time-duration itself is an element, that is our evidence both for these two aspects of the stream, as a knowing and as an existent, and also for the opposite directions which the two aspects seem to take, the aspect of it as a knowing receding into the past, as the aspect of it as an existent advances into the future. In short, I draw a wide distinction between the *content* and the *existence* of consciousness (and of every portion or moment of it), but it is a distinction between inseparables.

Now, in its character of an existent, every present moment of consciousness depends, as we cannot but think, for its arising or genesis as an existent, upon some efficient cause or causes, so to call them, which have existed in the past, though unknown to us at the moment of operation. I pass over here the psychological question as to the nature of the proximate efficient cause or causes of consciousness. These do not now concern us. They lie wholly in the past. On the other hand, the purposes of the stream of consciousness, which belong to it in its character of a knowing, and therefore the purposes, if any, of its efficient causes, lie in the future, wholly unknown to us except as purposed, that is, by anticipation; though it will be to this same series and system of agents and events, moving from past to present and then to future, that, if they are realized, their realization will be due.

As conscious agents, then, we form part of what may be called a scheme or system of dynamic teleology, as compared to that system of statical teleology described above. The whole of consciousness is teleological, the whole of conscious activity is consciously teleological, directed to realize some purpose in the future, which in the present is anticipation only. The content of a purpose or anticipated end is also called a motive. But this term is ambiguous, and stands in

need of analysis. It includes the idea of a known, i. e. consciousness, and an unknown, i. e. activity or agency, in a single term. The analysis of motives, as distinguished from purposes or ends, is a question for Psychology, as that border science which includes the study of the efficient causation of consciousness as well as of consciousness itself, and of the connexion between them.

Barring this special psychological question, the sciences of the second or Academical group are directed to discover the meaning, and compare the relative value, of conscious actions, in all departments of conscious activity, without analysing the efficient agencies involved in the actions themselves, whether these belong to conscious beings or to inanimate nature, just as the sciences of the first group, the natural or physical sciences, are directed to discover the actual efficient agencies and their laws, which are operative in the production of all phenomena without distinction. And this, as it seems to me, is the true distinction between these two great groups of sciences, namely, not that the first deals with the laws of Matter, the second with those of Mind, but that the first deals with the laws of what we are accustomed to call efficient causation, the second with those of what we are accustomed to call final causation, being occupied with the meaning and value of things for conscious beings,—not with the question *How comes?* but with the question *What for?*—a question which can only be asked, and consequently only answered, if at all, in terms of consciousness. Just as the sciences of the first group make abstraction, as already said, of the fact that consciousness is the only evidence of any sort of existence, so those of the second group (with the exception of Psychology) make abstraction of the fact that purposes are only formed, or communicated, or realized, by means of some efficient agency which is not consciousness, though this fact is always present in the background, just as the corresponding abstraction, from consciousness, is present in the physical sciences. And this abstraction from the difference between the supporting agency and the consciousness supported by it is expressed and embodied in the universal and inevitable use of the personal pronouns, I and WE, whereby the two things, the consciousness and the agency, are represented as one thing, an unanalysable Conscious Agent.

II.

Now it is the primary purpose and function of Philosophy, which, with its cognate or subordinate sciences, Psychology, Ethic, Logic, Aesthetic, Theology, and possibly others, is the third of our four Sections, to push the analysis of the content of consciousness (which,

if I may repeat the remark, is our sole evidence for anything whatever) as far as self-consciousness enables us to push it. It is this primary function, this selection for analysis of consciousness as a knowing, or as the evidence of everything, itself included, rather than any being or existence assumed as already known or knowable, which makes it a Metaphysic, and distinguishes it from a professedly philosophical Ontology. As ontology, philosophy would have no place among sciences which are founded on experience; as metaphysic it stands in relation to them all. Its first purpose is to show by its analysis what is the *meaning* of such terms as Being and Existence, or Reality as opposed to Appearance, instead of assuming their objects either as ultimate and unanalysable *data*, or as the objects of ultimate and unanalysable conceptions. Its second purpose is to explain, in the sense of rendering intelligible, the Totality of Existence, in case that purpose should be found attainable, and, if not attainable, at any rate to show by its analysis what and where are the limits, and in what their nature consists, which for ever forbid its attainment, and what is the character which is thereby imprinted upon the knowledge which lies within those limits, and is therefore conceivably attainable. Such are its purposes, and such its method. And the object-matter which it has before it, and to which its analysis has to be applied, is that view of the Totality of Existence which is taken by men in general, including the metaphysician himself, before they begin to philosophize, namely, speaking roughly, as a World of Persons and Things, of Substances and their Attributes, of Agents and their Agencies, which may fairly be called the common-sense view of things, and in this sense is the *explicandum* of philosophy.

But it is in its departments of Ethic, Logic, Aesthetic, and Theology, departments which are immediately dependent upon the metaphysical analysis of consciousness as a knowing, that Philosophy itself becomes definitely a science of practice, inasmuch as these sciences aim at influencing for the better certain departments of the actual practice of mankind, by applying to them ideas derived from metaphysical analysis. Perhaps we may say that Theology, which includes a criticism of all professedly Religious Creeds, is that department of philosophy in which this influence is most sensibly and most generally felt. It is there that men in general are most keenly alive to its influence, and most fervently resent its interference. Nevertheless it is based, like the rest, on the metaphysical and also (to use a lately coined word) metapsychical analysis of consciousness as a knowing, purged of those common-sense assumptions which belong in fact not to its *data* but to its *explicanda*.

the idea of Justice, of Right as distinguished from Might. The aim of all Law is to establish a just rule, to give might to right, instead of ascribing right to might as its indistinguishable attribute. The recognition of this idea is the foundation of the science of Jurisprudence. But whence is this idea derived? It is derived from those phenomena of consciousness which are the special object-matter of Ethic, a special department of Philosophy. Law, therefore, the object-matter of our fourth Section, has a double affinity; in its specially scientific character, as Jurisprudence, it is the offspring of the ethical idea of justice or of right; in its operation, that is, in the application of this idea to modify existing facts, it is a distinguishable but wholly inseparable department of history proper.

There are other special sciences which, like law, may be treated apart from history proper, though always as its subservients or contributories; for instance, the science of Political Economy and the science of War, the latter of which has a branch of law already recognized as applicable to it. But distinct from all such special sciences there will still remain, as the object-matter of history proper, all those dealings of men with one another in society, and of societies with one another, in connexion always with their physical conditions and circumstances, which require only a general knowledge of human nature, its motives and capacities (distinct from their psychological mechanism in individuals), in order to understand them, interpret their significance, and draw the conclusions which they warrant, for the guidance of present and future action. Domestic, social, political, and international actions are, in short, the field of History proper. And it need scarcely be mentioned how vast this field is, nor yet how closely it touches the daily life of individuals, nor yet how indispensable is true historical knowledge, taken simply as the ascertainment of actual matters of fact, for guiding that daily life aright. Historical science is a science of practice, and of that practice which every man of necessity practises, simply as a member of human society. Its true name therefore is Sociology.

It remains to say a few words of Philology, our second Section, and its selected object-matter, Language; that is to say, of oral and articulate speech addressed to the ear, and of writing, its symbol and representative, addressed to the eye. Its function also in both its modes is twofold; it serves to fix and thereby mediately to recall feelings and thoughts within the individual consciousness, and it serves to communicate the feelings and thoughts of one individual to others; it is, for psychological reasons, the all but indispensable medium both of thought and of intercommunication. It is therefore

almost as intimately and universally bound up with the conscious actions of human beings as consciousness itself. Its history is the history of its development and evolution from that point or points in its course at which we place the differentiation of man from his pre-human ancestors, a differentiation to which the formation of articulate forms of speech may itself have most effectively contributed. I say point or points in its course, because this differentiation may have taken place at spots of the earth's surface widely separate from one another geographically, and differing also in climate and other physical conditions; nor need the differentiations have occurred simultaneously. Philology is therefore capable of furnishing most important evidence to Ethnology. And at all periods of its history we find language a potent factor in moulding the ideas of those who speak it, whether it is their native tongue that they speak or one which they have adopted from others; and the familiar use of a common language, especially if native to those who use it, is notoriously one of the most powerful bonds of fellowship between men, however widely they may be scattered over the surface of the globe.

I come lastly to that function of language whereby it is most closely and intimately connected with the consciousness of individuals, though this can never be actually sundered from its function of intercommunication, the individuals being born and living, and except in the rarest cases of attempted isolation continuing to live, only in society. And here the first question to meet us is, What is meant by articulation, what are its essential characteristics? The utterance of sounds having, or capable of having, meaning of some sort is doubtless the concomitant of a reflex action initiated by feelings, or the proximate conditions of feelings, internal to the organism, whereby an association in consciousness between the feelings and the utterances is established. But this expressive utterance alone is not articulate language, however numerous, various in kind, and I may add complex, such associations may be; it is only, if the term may be permitted, its raw material. True, the establishment of the associations gives the sounds meaning; they express and serve to recall into consciousness the feelings or ideas with which they are associated, and those feelings or ideas are their meaning. But more than this is required to render them articulate. What is this *more*? I speak under correction from experts both in psychology and philology, though what I rather fear is, that I may seem to be giving undue prominence to what is already well understood and trite. Nevertheless it seems important to notice, that

the essential step towards turning utterances having meaning into articulate language is attention as an act of thought, attention first to the feelings or ideas whereby similar occurrences of them are grouped together as one feeling or idea in point of kind, which is the formation of general ideas, and secondly to the utterances expressing them, whereby similar occurrences of the utterances are perceived to be but one sound in point of kind; that is to say, to be one word, one term, expressing one general idea. Articulate speech or language is thus the work of thought operating on perception. It is co-extensive with thought, but not with consciousness in its entirety; for it presupposes the perceptions upon which it operates—that is, both the feelings or ideas originally expressed and the sounds originally expressing them, the latter of which become language expressing general ideas by the operation of thought.

The very first step in this process, the formation of general ideas by attending to the data, involves a judgement, such as we should express, language having once been formed, by a proposition: 'this colour is similar to that.' From this point the development of what are called the parts of speech follows easily. To express a particular instance, you must restrict a general term—*this* blue, *this* man; pronouns are used for nouns; then nouns substantive and nouns adjective are distinguished; verbs expressing activity and passivity are distinguished from verbs expressing simply event, such as 'it rains, it thunders'; and differences in actions and events are marked by differences of voice, mood, tense, number, and person, in the verbs expressing them, and by what may be called the adjectival forms of verbs, such as the participle and gerund. Then links are sought, expressing the relations of things to each other, by means of prepositions or by the case endings of nouns, by different forms for singular and plural, or by marking sex as by the genders. Similar links are sought to express the transitions of thought between one action or event and another; such are the conjunctions. Sentences are thus the articulation of language, and language has been an ever-advancing construction, from the first moment when men turned their attention to their own vocal utterances, as a means of fixing their own ideas or communicating them to others. It has grown up *pari passu* with their common-sense idea of themselves and the world about them, and (except in the case of technical or scientific symbolism) subserves no other needs than those of daily life, or than are capable of an expression in literature.

I need not stay to remark at length, how vast a field and what important regions of human life are brought within the province of

philology by its inseparable literary development. One limitation of it, however, should not be left unnoticed. Articulate language cannot alone communicate to the reader or hearer of it the sensations or the emotional feelings which it describes, with anything like the vividness or the certainty with which it communicates the ideas or the thoughts describing them. To do this even imperfectly, in the case of the emotional feelings, it depends upon accents, pauses, stresses, intonation, in short, upon the vocal modulation given to it by the reader or the speaker, as in singing and acting. That is, it depends upon the musical element in vocal utterance; and this belongs to the province of aesthetic, not of philology. Music, in fact, has been called the language of the emotions, and rightly so called, seeing that it expresses and communicates emotional feeling without the aid of imagery or of thought. Music has, no doubt, an articulation of its own, but it is not that articulate language with which philology is conversant.

The further articulation of language, the further evolution and development of its construction by devising or adopting new verbal forms to express new modifications of thought, as for instance a form to differentiate a word used to express a mode of consciousness from the same word used to express the object (which may also be one of the real conditions) of that mode;—say, e.g., light as a sensation in us from light as a motion in the luminiferous ether;—this is a task which, if practicable at all, must be left to the speakers of the language to be modified, just as the introduction of new technical terms which involve no change in its structural articulation is left to specialists. Ordinary language is capable of enrichment in both directions, but it is obvious that to make any advance in the former direction involves, as its pre-requisite, a general advance in the habitual demand for accurate and subtle thinking on the part of a whole community. And even if there should be such a general advance it may not be found adequate to effect a structural modification of a language which has reached that stage of its development which we call maturity.

It is to promote the well-being of mankind at large, not of the greater number only as estimated by majorities, but of every individual who shall be born into the aggregate, so far as this depends upon what he is and feels and thinks and does; that is, upon his powers of self-knowledge and self-control, rather than upon the command he has over the forces of inanimate nature, or of any nature other than his own, that the Academical Sciences, now included, or to be included in the future, under our four Sections, are

ultimately directed. The harmonizing of the conscious actions of individuals by applying the lessons of the past, and leading individuals to see what purposes are desirable or the reverse in each department of knowledge, what are realizable and what illusory, is the ulterior aim of all: no definite fixed state of society, but a progressive interaction of all its members, recognized and promoted by all. Human nature is still *in fieri*, and the final issue of its history cannot be foreseen. But we may fairly hope that the foundation of the Academy will appreciably further the realization of this progressive interaction, which is the common though ulterior aim of the sciences of practice which it brings together into contact and collaboration.

What I have tried in the first place to show in this paper is, that the internal organization of the academical sciences, as I have ventured to call it, is no less essential to the realization of their common and ulterior aim than the corporate organization of their several devotees in an Academy. And in the next place I have attempted to indicate what, in my opinion, is the only possible way in which that internal organization can be effected, namely, by connecting the sciences of our first, second, and fourth Sections with those of our third, that is, with philosophy, which alone possesses in its metaphysical department a secure foundation for any science whatever, being itself founded, alone among all, upon the analysis of consciousness, or experience, without initial assumptions of any kind.

at present
1002

af

283

Columbus

Oxford

Printed by Horace Hart, at the University Press

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY



0026051672

060

H66

Hodgson

... Inter-relation of the sciences
academic

MAR 11 1971

